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party tort-feasor would be distributed according to the law of distribution of personal property left by the employee dying intestate, while
the award 'from the workmen's compensation fund would be paid to
the dependents of the deceased. It follows that if a remittitur had
been allowed, as in Brewer v. Appalachian Constructors, Inc., supra,
either the amount recovered through workmen's compensation by the
dependents would 'be denied as a result of the distributees recovery
from third parties or the distributees of the employee would be denied
full recovery of the judgment entered in their behalf, as a result of
the dependent's claim through workmen's compensation.
The conclusion in the principal case solves the dilemma regarding who may recover, and the limit of the negligent third party's
liability can no longer be gauged by the statutory, ex contractu,
insurance feature of an award from workmen's compensation. The
rule thus established, although appearing to be against the weight
of authority in the United States, is supportable by sound reasoning
and pages of historic record, the common law.
James William Sarver

ABSTRACTS
Criminal Law-Witnesses--Compulsion of Spouse to Testify
D was tried and convicted of knowingly transporting a woman
in interestate commerce for the purpose of prostitution, in violation
of the Mann Act. In the District Court, the woman, who had since
the date of the offense married D, was ordered, over her objection
and that of D, to testify on behalf of the prosecution.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the District Court.
Held, judgment affirmed. Prosecution under the Mann Act constituted exception to the common law rule ordinarily permitting a
party to exclude adverse testimony of his or her spouse, and in
such a prosecution, witness who was victim of offense as well as D's
wife, could be compelled to testify against him. Wyatt v. United
States, 80 Sup. Ct. 901 (1960).
The United States Supreme Court, in upholding the continued
validity of the common-law rule of evidence ordinarily permitting
a party to exclude the adverse testimony of his or her spouse,
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expressly aeknowledged that this rule does not apply in certain
kinds of offenses committed by the party against his spouse. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 79 Sup. Ct. 136 (1958).
The common law exception that the spouse is a competent
witness where she is the victim of the crime charged against the
other spouse is recognized in State v. Woodrow, 58 W. Va. 527,
52 S.E. 545 (1905). W. VA. CODE ch. 57, art. 3 § 3 (Michie 1955),
presently provides for the common law exception as stated in State
v. Woodrow, supra.
W. VA. CODE ch. 61, art. 8 § 7 (Michie 1955), provides that
a person who procures a woman for the purpose of becoming a
prostitute is a panderer and further provides that in prosecutions
for such ,offenses the wife is a competent witness against her spouse.
The statute does not limit its express provisions as to competency to
those where the spouse is the victim of the crime. Since West
Virginia allows the wife to be a competent witness against her husband where she is the victim of the crime charged against him, and
as she may also 'be a comvetent witness in a case involving prosecutions for offenses involvini prostitution even where she was not a
victim of -the crime, it appears that in the absence of any other
individual rieht protecting the spouse against compulsion to testify.
i.e. self-incrimination, under West Virginia law, the wife may be
compelled to testify against her husband in prosecutions involving
the subiot matter of the principal case.

Labor-Redress Against Arbitrary Expulsion
Ps allege that prior to enactment of the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 they were expelled from union
membership without being advised of the charges against thorn and
without a full fair hearing. They seek redress against the union
in the Federal District Court.
Held, D's motion to dismiss granted. There being no preexisting right under state or federal law granting expelled union
members redress against arbitrary expulsion itself, the "bill of
rights" provision of the Labor Management Disclosure Act of 1959
gave not only a new remedy but new substantive rights to members
of labor organizations. Robertson v. Banana Handlers Int'l Ass'n,
183 F. Supp. 423 (E.D. La. 1960).
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The courts that have passed upon the issue appear -to ,hold that
one who 'has been arbitrarily expelled from union membership was
prejudiced in his ights and should be afforded an opportunity to
make his defense. Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 37 C. 2d
134, 231 P.2d 6 (1951), Dragwa v. Federal Labor Union, 136
N.J.Eq. 172, 41 A.2d 32 (1945). The West Virginia Supreme
Court has ruled in accordance with this view, for in Gleason v.
Thomas, 121 W. Va. 619, 5 S.E.2d 791 (1939), it held that a
union ruling against its members may be set aside on appeal if
there is a showing that said members 'had no opportunity to present
their claims or where there was arbitrary action on the part of the
union tribunal.
The holding of the District Court is subject to question in
Louisiana itself for in Elfer v. Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass'n,
179 La. 383, 154 So. 32 (1934), the court provides for judicial
review of union proceedings which "are violate of the law of the
society or the law of the land." We may conclude from the foregoing that the Labor Management Disclosure Act did not establish
new substantive Tights but that the District Court did not wish to
make itself a forum for litigation and application of possible remedies which union members may have had under state law prior to
enactment of the aforementioned act.

Pleading-Amended Complaint Changing Cause of Action
P 'brought an action for damages. After the expiration of the
statute of limitations P moved the court to amend the complaint
to allege willful and wanton acts claiming exemplary damages.
D contended that the amended complaint asserted a new cause of
action which is barred under the statute of limitations.
Held, the District Court allowed the amended complaint. In
view of notice pleading concept of federal rules, where proposed
amendment to complaint to allege wanton misconduct was aimed
squarely at conduct which was subject of original complaint and
amendment would insert no new cause of action but merely define
with greater particularity alleged negligence for which P claimed
additional damages, amendment would be allowed after expiration
of limitation period. Cavanaugh v. Trans World Airlines, 183 F.
Supp. 370 (W.D. Pa. 1960).
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The ruling of the court does not clarify its position in relation
to the problem of amending a complaint and thereby presenting a
new cause of action. The court apparently feels that an amendment
to a complaint should be allowed only if such amendment does not
present a new cause of action. There 'appears to be a two-fold
problem involving changes in causes of action. First, FED. R. Civ.
P. 15, contains no limitation that an amendment shall not change
a cause of action. However, FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c), states that
such change giving rise to a new cause of action shall not relate
back to the date of the original pleading unless the "claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in
the original pleading."
An amendment giving rise to an entirely new cause of action
was allowed in International Ladies' Garment Workers Union v.
Donnelly Garment Co., 121 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1941), where
plaintiff, whose cause of action was based solely on the Sherman
Act, was permitted to file an amendment dismissing the resident
defendant and restating the claim as a civil action based on diversity
of citizenship. The problem of relation back to the original pleadings
did not arise in this case.
That plaintiff might introduce a completely new cause of action
by an amendment, but that such amendment would not relate back
to the commencement of his action so as to toll the statute of limitations, was upheld in Union Pac. R.R. v. Wyler, 158 U.S. 285, 15
Sup. Ct. 877 (1895), where plaintiff, a railroad company employee,
instead of bringing an action against the company based on the
general law of master and servant, amended his petition, after the
expiration of the statute of limitations, changing the nature of his
claim and basing it upon a statute of Kansas giving the employee
rights in derogation of the general law.
Green v. Walsh, 21 F.R.D. 15 (E.D. Wis. 1957), substantiates
the position -that if a change in a cause of action arises out of the
same occurrence or transaction as stated in the original pleadings,
it shall relate back to those pleadings and be permitted even though
the statute of limitations had apparently run during the period between filing of the original and amended complaints.
With the adoption of the new West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure, the limitation in W. VA. CODE ch. 56, art. 4, § 24 (Michie
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1955), on allowing amended complaints introducing new causes
of action will be void. Under W. VA. R.C.P. 15, it will be permissible for an amendment to state a new cause of action, one which
can be based on a different transaction or occurrence. Such an
amendment will not, however, under W. VA. R.C.P. 15(c), be
allowed to relate back to the date of the original pleadings, and the
running of the statute of limitations prior to the filing of the amendment will be a 'bar to its introduction.

Property-Federal Tax Lien-Divestiture By State
Foreclosure Proceedings
In two similar cases, mortgagees, after obtaining a judgment
against the mortgagors, had the mortgaged property sold. In both
instances the United States held a tax lien, concededly junior, on
the mortgaged property. The United States was not a party to the
proceedings in either instance nor was it required, under state law,
to be a party to such proceedings. In a suit by the United States
to enforce the tax lien 'against Pennsylvania mnortgagees and in
a second suit by the California mortgagees who had bought the
property in, against the United States to quiet title, the Pennsylvania
and California District Courts rendered judgment for the mortgagees.
The Pennsylvania case was affirmed on appeal while the California case was reversed. Held, Pennsylvania case affirmed, California case reversed. State law governing divestiture of federal tax
liens was to be adopted as federal law, except to -the extent that
Congress might have entered the field. In both instances, a junior
federal lien was effectively extinguished, though the United States
was not, and was not required to be, a party to the proceedings under
state law United States v. Brosnan; Bank of America v. United
States, 80 Sup. Ct. 1108 (1960).
A pre-existing mortgage will 'be superior in priority to a federal
lien. Conrad v. Atlantic Insurance Co., 26 U.S. 386 (1828). The
United States does not -have to be named a party to foreclosure
proceedings so as to extinguish its junior lien 'unless state law entitles
or requires junior lienors to be joined with other parties to the suit.
United States v. Cless, 254 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1958). In the Cless
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case, the United States held a second mortgage rather than a tax
lien. 62 Stat. 869 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2410 (1952), does not
require such joinder as far as federal law is concerned but does
consent to such joinder where state law provides for it. Hence,
it appears that in West Virginia, by following state laws regarding
the sale of property under trust deeds, one can extinguish a junior
federal tax lien.
Aaron David Trub
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